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1 INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty is part and parcel of the human condition. The need to manage
climate risk has shaped human institutions formany centuries, giving rise to
insurance in agricultural societies and to patterns of land holdings across
medieval Europe. I Today's concern about global climate change breaks new
ground. It challenges conventional wisdom in two ways. One is the world-
wide scope of the changes considered. We are concerned with potential
catastrophes, such as changes in the sea level and global shifts in the avail-
ability of water and fertile soil . No society can ignore such risks . The second
challenge is that these changes appear to be driven by human activity, which
has now reached levels at which it can affect the earth's fundamental
processes, such as its atmosphere and its climate. These two new elements,
the global and endogenous nature of these risks, have extended human
uncertainty both qualitatively and quantitatively.
Traditional formulations of uncertainty no longer provide an adequate
basis for analysis. As shown below, catastrophic risks are not treated ade-
quately by conventional risk analysis, nor are the type of risks that
humans induce through their economic activity. Climate risks can be the
byproduct of human activity. This adds a new dimension to the uncer-
tainty about earth processes. To the extent that we cannot predict human
actions, we cannot predict their potential environmental impact . I call
this phenomenon endogenous uncertainty . It is a sign of the times, and
characterizes our age. For the first time in history, humans are playing a
predominant role in determining the world's ecosystems, on land and
water, and can influence the planet's atmosphere.
Our impact on the earth's processes is unknown. This impact encom-
passes much more than the traditional concerns about where humans
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decide to settle, whether they settle in vulnerable areas such as coasts or
near volcanoes. The issue is how we are affecting the overall biodiversity
of the planet, how we may be changing the planet's atmosphere and its
soil fertility across the different continents and bodies of water. These
changes are often caused by economic consumption from far-away
human settlements. 3 The economic use of the earth's resources today
could induce the main risks that humankind faces in the future .
Environmental stress may be a symptom rather than a disease.
Historical circumstances have led to an uneven spread of the industrial
revolution across the world . The world contains regions with very
different institutions, such as different property rights and markets.
Developing countries have common property on resources such as
forests and minerals ; in industrial countries these tend to be privately
owned. This difference plays a major role in the extraction of resources
and the production of resource-intensive products - fossil fuels, forest-
based products . Differences in property rights lead developing
countries, many of which are still agricultural societies, to overextract
natural resources and to export them to industrial nations at prices that
are below real costs (Chichilnisky 1994a, 1996b) . Low prices lead to
overconsumption worldwide. The global environmental problem we face
today reflects distorted prices and an uneven use of the earth's
resources. The matter is further complicated by the emphasis
on resource-intensive growth advocated by the Bretton Woods
institutions and by many traditional economists in the Western hemi-
sphere since the end of the Second World War (Chichilnisky 1996b;
Institute for Policy Studies 1996) . This is believed to be at the root
of the carbon emissions problem, the destruction of biodiversity, and
the attendant climate risks (Chichilnisky 1994a, 1996b) . Before we
can solve the environmental problem we need to develop economic
institutions that value properly the earth's resources and the welfare of
the humans that are their stewards .
This chapter focusses on global environmental risks such as climate
change, an issue that must be confronted as we move into the future. It
proposes sound principles of risk management that make sense in
today's society generally, going beyond their role of averting and hedg-
ing climate risks. This chapter is about these and related questions. In
attempting to answer them, it deals with different aspects of the theory
of risk-bearing. I explain current responses to global change, focusing
on the new challenges : human-induced or endogenous risks, including
potentially catastrophic risks, which are not adequately treated by tradi-
tional economic analysis.
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There are five key aspects of risk which recur in the analysis . As
already mentioned, two of them are essentially new: these risks are driven
by human activity and could have catastrophic consequences. The global
risks that we face are influenced by our actions and are thus endogenous .4
Our actions have become an important determinant of the risks we face.
The chapter analyses markets with endogenous uncertainty, as well as
growing economies where today's economic activity determines tomor-
row's land productivity. In both cases practical policies are recommended.
The other new aspect of climate risks is that they could have catastrophic
consequences : they involve small probabilities of events with major,
negative consequences. Classical decision theory has neglected decision-
making involving catastrophic risks . Based on Chichilnisky (1996f) I
present a rigorous treatment of decisionmaking under catastrophic risks
and propose practical solutions.
There are three, more conventional, aspects of climate risks that have
been neglected in the economic literature and are analysed here . The first
concerns the difficulty in assessing risks. Most climate-related risks are
difficult to quantify. Indeed, in a statistical sense the probabilities
describing them appear to be unknowable. We may never be able to
determine experimentally the probability of global climate change in the
relative frequency sense. Such events are inherently unique. It is possible
to evaluate the frequency of occurrence of a health risk from morbidity
or mortality data, as the outcomes of repeated experiments are available .
However we cannot evaluate the risks from C02 emissions in this way. 5
The chapter proposes new financial instruments for hedging optimally
against this type of uncertainty, which I call `scientific uncertainty' .
These instruments are called `catastrophe bundles', and were introduced
in Chichilnisky (1995, 1996a, 1997a and 1998). The second conventional
aspect is the correlation of risks. Events such as climate change could
affect large numbers of people in the same way. A rise in sea level could
affect low-level coastal communities in most countries. Insurance in the
traditional sense of risk-pooling works best for large numbers of small
statistically independent or `individual' risks. We have to ask what types
of markets work best with partly individual and partly collective risks.
This chapter proposes a way to solve this problem.
Irreversibility is the final issue . In this area, many major economic deci-
sions and their consequences are likely to be irreversible, or if reversible
they involve very large costs and lengthy time scales. Climate change, the
melting of ice caps, desertification and species extinction are all processes
not easily reversible within relevant time scales. This leads to option values .
The possibility that future generations will have different preferences from
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us can also lead to option values, but of a different nature (Beltratti,
Chichilnisky and Heal 1998). This chapter explores this question.
In summary, we are dealing with risks that have two major new char-
acteristics : they are endogenous and potentially catastrophic . In addition,
climate risks have three more conventional features : they are poorly
understood, correlated and irreversible . In all cases, this chapter proposes
ways to advance our understanding of the problems. In policy terms,
the nature and extent of uncertainty about global climate change imply
that society's position will be dominated by questions such as :
" What cost is it worth incurring to reduce the poorly understood risk of
climate change, or to improve our understanding of that risk? and
" How may existing social institutions, such as insurance contracts and
securities markets, be used to provide the most efficient allocation of
the risks associated with global climate change?
This chapter proposes ways to evaluate decisions under endogenous
and potentially catastrophic risks, and incorporates often neglected fea-
tures of correlated, poorly understood and irreversible risks. The analysis
proposed here opens new ways of thinking and at the same time poses
new challenges . At the end I indicate new areas of research .
2 SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY
The uncertainty about climate has several sources. There is uncertainty
about basic scientific relationships, such as the link between gaseous
emissions and global mean temperature. There is also uncertainty about
the connection between global mean temperature and climate. Clearly it
is climate, a variable encompassing wind patterns, humidity and rain pat-
terns, and not just temperature, that matters from an economic
perspective. The floods of 1993 in the US and Bangladesh have reminded
us of the profound vulnerability of human settlement to climate, as has
hurricane Andrew, which led to about $20 billion of losses in the south-
ern US at about the same time. Climatologists link these to El Nino, the
ocean current off the coast of Chile, confirming the global linkages
within the earth's climate system .
Future emissions of greenhouse gases and future climate are also
highly uncertain. Furthermore, as already pointed out, these emissions
can be driven by economic activity and by policy measures: hence the
risks faced are endogenous.
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Societies can respond to the risks associated with such uncertainty. One
way is mitigation . The other is insurance. We can think of them as broadly
equivalent to prevention and cure, respectively, in the medical field.
Mitigation means taking measures to reduce the possible damage.
One way of doing this is to take steps that minimize the damage if the
harmful event occurs. Building levees, canals and flood drainage sys-
tems to reduce the impact of flood waters is an example. An alternative
approach to mitigation is to reduce the incidence of harmful events. Of
course, if steps are taken to reduce the risk of climate change, then the
risks become endogenous, determined by our policy measures. This con-
trasts with most models of resource allocation under uncertainty, in
which probabilities are about acts of nature and are therefore exoge-
nous .6 In a traditional market approach, there is no scope for mitigation
in the second sense of improving odds . The probabilities of states in an
Arrow-Debreu market may be subjective and a trader's subjective prob-
abilities may be altered by learning ; however, the frequency of incidence
of harmful events cannot be altered by traders. The same is true in the
classical models of insurance, where the incidence of harmful events is
again taken to be exogenous. Mitigation acquires a new meaning when
risks are endogenous .
Insurance by contrast does nothing to reduce the chances of damage
due to climate change . It only arranges for those who are adversely affected
to receive compensation after the event, as in the case of federal disaster
relief for flood victims in the US. Insurance is a major economic activity,
involving both the insurance industry and large parts of the securities
industry, about $1 .2 trillion worth of economic activity yearly. Can the
existing and very extensive private sector organizations provide those at
risk from climate change with adequate insurance cover? If not, why not?
What changes in market institutions might be appropriate in this case?
The following provides a brief survey of traditional responses to risk.
3 RESPONSES TO RISK IN TRADITIONAL MARKETS
Economists have two standard models of risk allocation in a market
economy. The more general is that of Arrow and Debreu, in which agents
trade `contingent commodities' . The alternative is the model of insurance
via risk-pooling in large populations. Neither case addresses the issue of
mitigation via a reduction in the incidence of harmful events .
In the Arrow-Debreu market there is a set of exogenous `states of
nature' whose values are random and represent the sources of uncer-
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tainty. Classically one thinks of events such as earthquakes and meteor
strikes. Agents in the economy are allowed to trade commodities contin-
gent on the values of these exogenous variables. These are called
'state-contingent commodities' . With a complete set of markets for state-
contingent commodities, the first theorem of welfare economics holds for
economies under uncertainty: an ex-ante Pareto efficient allocation of
resources can be attained by a competitive economy with uncertainty
about exogenous variables .
Arrow (1953) showed that efficiency can in fact be attained by using a
mixture of securities markets and markets for noncontingent commodi-
ties, so that a complete set of contingent commodity markets is not
required . This observation provides a natural and important role for
securities markets in the allocation of risk-bearing . The securities used
are contracts that pay one unit if and only if a particular state occurs .
While the contingent contract approach is in principle all-inclusive and
covers most conceivable cases of uncertainty, in practical terms there are
cases where it can be impossible to implement. It can be very demanding
in terms of the number of markets required . For example, if agents face
individual risks (that is, risks whose incidence varies from individual to
individual), then in a population of 100 similar agents each of whom
faces two possible states, the number of markets required would be 2100
(Chichilnisky and Heal 1992a) . The number of markets required is so
large as to make the contingent contract approach unrealistic .
The use of insurance markets for pooling risks is a less general but
more practical alternative . This requires that populations be large and
that the risks be small, similar and statistically independent. The law of
large numbers then operates and the frequency of occurrence of an
insured event in a large sample of agents approximates its frequency in
the population as a whole. There is thus a role for insurance companies to
act as intermediaries and pool large numbers of similar but statistically
independent risks. In so doing they are able via aggregation and the use
of the law of large numbers to neutralize the risks faced by many similar
agents . The main references on this are Arrow and Lind (1970) and
Malinvaud (1972, 1973); recently Cass et al . (1996) updated this analysis
to incorporate individual risks with mutual insurance.
The insurance approach is at a disadvantage when risks are correlated .
When large numbers of individuals are likely to be affected at once, risk-
pooling will not work. However, it does have the advantage relative to the
contingent market approach of economizing dramatically on the number
of markets needed. In the above example, only two mutual insurance con-
tracts and 2809 securities would be needed instead of 2100 contingent
contracts (see Chichilnisky and Heal 1992a, and Cass et al . 1996).
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When risks are allocated by trading state-contingent commodities
securities, or by risk-pooling and insurance, it is very important that
agents know, or believe that they know, the relative frequencies of the states
of nature, at least approximately . This is obvious when trading insurance
contracts. The actuarial calculations needed to set insurance premia can
only be performed if the parties believe that the relative frequencies of
the insured events are approximately known.
In the Arrow-Debreu approach, it suffices to think of agents maximiz-
ing expected utility to appreciate the need for them to know, or at least
behave as if they know, the relative frequencies of exogenous states . These
frequencies are the weights placed on their utilities from state-dependent
consumption . The point is simple : if agents cannot assign relative fre-
quencies then their preferences are not well defined and they cannot act
to maximize expected utility.
In the context of climate change this may be too demanding. Agents
do not know the frequencies of different states, and recognize that they
do not know them. They recognize that there are several different opin-
ions about what these are, but feel unable to choose definitively between
these alternatives. If they were expected utility maximizers, they would be
uncertain about their own preferences. In such a case, it is natural to
think of the frequency distribution over climate changes as a state of the
world : a risk, in the Savage sense. We do not know what value the fre-
quency will assume, and whatever value this is, it affects economic
activity. As shown below, ignorance then assumes the role of a collective
risk, and can be treated by the use of state-contingent markets. One
sometimes thinks of uncertainty about probabilities being resolved by
learning . This is an avenue which is not open when scientific knowledge is
incomplete and experiments are not possible, for example, in the case of
global warming. In this case an alternative approach is the opening of
new markets (see Chichilnisky and Heal 1992a) .
In sum : the Arrow-Debreu approach to risk allocation via state-
contingent markets is universally applicable. However, it is cumbersome
and unrealistically complex when risks have individual components.
Insurance markets are more manageable, but leave uncovered collective
risks such as the risk induced by ignorance of the true frequency distribu-
tion of harmful events. It would be natural to allow agents to trade
securities contingent on such collective risks, and cover the individual
components of risks by mutual insurance contracts. This approach is
developed below. Although new to the economics literature, it is argued
below that some of the oldest risk-bearing institutions recorded, agricul-
tural cooperatives, have a similar structure.
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4 SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTYAS COLLECTIVE RISK
Consider an economy in which agents face risks whose relative frequen-
cies they cannot evaluate . Such risks could derive from the impact of
global climate change on income levels via floods, storms or droughts, or
from the effects on health of ozone depletion, acid rain or air pollution.
There are widely differing opinions about their frequency, on which there
is inadequate information. What market structure would ensure efficient
risk allocation in this situation?
Chichilnisky and Heal (1992a), formalize the situation in a simple
general equilibrium model. Each agent faces the risk of being in one of
several states (for example, healthy or sick, productive or unproduc-
tive). No one knows what is the true frequency distribution of affected
agents . A probability is assigned to each possible frequency. A typical
probability distribution of this type might state, for example, that there
is a 10 per cent chance that 90 per cent of the population will be
harmed by global warming, a 25 per cent chance that 50 per cent of
the population will be harmed, and so on. The probability distribution
over alternative frequency distributions may be different from individ-
ual to individual .
In this framework, there are two levels of uncertainty. The first level is
collective : what is the distribution of agents who are harmed in the econ-
omy? Will 90 per cent be harmed, or only 30 per cent? This is a question
about the true incidence of the phenomenon over the population as a
whole. The second level of uncertainty is individual : it is whether a given
agent will be harmed or not by climate change. It revolves about ques-
tions such as : given that 90 per cent of the population will be harmed,
will a particular agent be harmed or not?
In our example of the impact of the depletion of the ozone layer on
cancer or the impact of climate change on agricultural productivity, the
two levels of uncertainty are: first, uncertainty about the true relationship
between ozone depletion and the incidence of individual disease in the
population as a whole, or about the true relationship between climate
change and agricultural productivity ; and second, uncertainty about
whether any given person or community will be affected.
Our ignorance of scientific processes (for example, the relation between
ozone depletion and skin cancer or between C02 emissions and climate
change) causes the collective risk, by which we mean the uncertainty about
the relative frequency of harmed agents in the population. Uncertainty
about this frequency is central to the problem. Even if this was resolved we
would still not know who will be damaged and who will not, but we would
at least know the frequency of the risk . Once frequencies are known, actu-
arial calculations can be conducted and the problem is insurable.
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I propose an institutional structure which uses two types of financial
instruments tailored to these two aspects of the problem. These lead to
efficient allocation in the face of such risks. I follow a framework
established by Cass et al . (1996) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1992a) .
One instrument is a mutual insurance contract to deal with the risks faced
by agents or communities contingent on each possible distribution of
harmful effects worldwide. A mutual insurance contract is an agreement
between parties subject to similar risks by which those who are harmed will
be compensated by the others . Examples are agricultural cooperatives of
the type recorded in Europe at least since the fifteenth century and the
nineteenth-century UK workers' associations and friendly societies. These
involved agreements between a group of workers that if one were sick and
unable to work, he or she would be compensated by the others. In the pre-
sent context, one could think of groups of communities subject to the
possible impact of climate change, with those unharmed compensating the
others . Making the terms of such a mutual insurance contract contingent
on the distribution of harmful effects worldwide means that there is a dif-
ferent compensation agreement between the parties for each possible
aggregate distribution of harmful effects. To know what compensation is
due in any particular case, the parties have first to assess the distribution of
harmful effects globally. On the basis of this they decide which mutual
insurance contract to apply.
Having dealt with individual risks by mutual insurance, we still face col-
lective risks. We need statistical securities to deal with these collective risks
induced by uncertainty about the overall distribution of adverse effects. We
propose to use a framework similar to Arrow securities : these are defined
as securities that pay one dollar if and only if a particular state of the
world occurs. In our case we use statistical securities which pay one dollar
if and only if there is a particular frequency of affected parties in the popu-
lation . As already noted, the incidence of impacts on the population as a
whole is being treated as a `state of the world' in the Arrow-Debreu sense.
We treat each possible distribution of adverse affects as a distinct collective
state (called a statistical state), and use securities markets to enable parties
to transfer wealth between these states. One Arrow security is needed for
each possible distribution of adverse effects worldwide, because to attain
Pareto efficiency each separate state must be covered by a security.
The following example helps to make this framework concrete . It is
illustrated in Figure 7 .1 . Consider a world of two countries 1 and 2, in
which the climate may be in one of two states a or R . There are two possi-
ble probability distributions over these two climate states . These
distributions are called A and B, with distribution A giving a probability
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of 0 .1 to climate state a and a probability of 0 .9 to climate state R.
Distribution B gives the reverse probabilities, that is, it gives probability
0.9 to climate state a and probability 0.1 to climate state P. The endow-
ments of the two countries depend on the climate state, and are as
follows: w t (a) is country 1's endowment vector if the climate is in state a,
and cue (a) is the corresponding endowment for country 2 . Similarly,
endowments in climate state R are given by w l (P) and w2 (R), respectively.
Endowments satisfy w1 (a) > w2 (a) and wi (R) <w2 (R), so that country 1
is relatively better off in state a and country 2 in state (3 .
Distribution A Distribution B
Security SA	Sec ritySB
States : a,
a = 0.1, = 0.9
2 better off in P
States : a,
a = 0.9,
1 better off in a
Transfers contingent Transfers contingent
on distribution A on distribution B
Figure 7.1 Statistical securities pay dependent on the distribution of states;
insurance contracts make transfers given a distribution of states
To reach an efficient allocation of risks we need two statistical securi-
ties. One, SA, pays $1 if and only if the probability distribution over states
of the climate is A . The other, SB, pays $1 if and only if the probability
distribution over states of the climate is B. In practice of course probabil-
ity distributions are not observable, and we cannot condition contracts
on unobservable events. So conditioning on probability distributions
means conditioning on frequency distributions consistent with that prob-
ability distribution in a sampling sense.
Countries can spread the risk arising from not knowing which is the
true distribution over states of the climate by trading these two securities.
In addition they make mutual insurance contracts conditional on states
of the climate. Such a contract could take the following form. If the dis-
tribution over climate states is A (distribution A gives probability 0.1 to
climate state a and probability 0 .9 to climate state R); then country 1
makes a transfer 0a to country 2 if the state of the climate is a, and
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country 2 makes a transfer AP2 to country 1 if the climate state is R . These
transfers satisfy 0.10a + 0.9 at 2 = 0 so that the expected transfer is zero
and the mutual insurance contract is actuarially fair. There would be a sim-
ilar contract to cover the case when the distribution over climate states is B
To summarize the argument : our ignorance of the frequency of the
impacts of climate change constitutes a collective risk. This collective risk
can be allocated through markets for statistical securities, which pay off
contingent on thatfrequency. For the individual risks that remain, it is more
practical to use contingent insurance contracts: this is done by having a dif-
ferent individual insurance contractfor each possiblefrequency of impacts.
There are two features of the results which are of general interest . One is
the development of a framework for achieving efficient allocations in the
face of uncertain risks. Given rapid changes in technology with potentially
far-reaching environmental impacts and health effects, the problem of pro-
viding insurance against such risks is particularly important . It is a matter
of active concern in the insurance industry. The second interesting feature
is the way a combination of securities markets and insurance markets can
be used to provide a relatively simple institutional structure for dealing with
unknowable risks . These are financial instruments called `catastrophe bun-
dles', introduced in Chichilnisky (1995, 1996e, 1996d) and Chichilnisky and
Heal (1998) . Current trends in the securitization of certain risks are consis-
tent with this analysis.
4.1 An Institutional Framework for Hedging Scientific Uncertainty
Our analysis suggests that although the risks associated with global cli-
mate change are very difficult to evaluate, there is nevertheless a market
framework within which insurance against scientific uncertainty can be
provided . It involves, first, identifying the set of possible descriptions of
the collective risks . Natural descriptions of risk are frequencies of occur-
rence of climate-related events such as floods, tropical storms or certain
temperature patterns.
Second, this framework involves introducing statistical securities
whose payoffs depend on which description of the risk is correct. This
amounts to allowing agents to bet on which model of the risk is correct.
Betting on which of several alternative descriptions of the way the world
works is correct is in effect what one does when choosing one research
strategy over another. Corporations, individuals and governments all do
this regularly but not efficiently. For example, a market for the securities
of high-technology firms pursuing different research strategies towards
the same goal is a financial market in which these bets are made.
Finally, our approach involves establishing compensation agreements
between harmed and unharmed regions that depend on which description
246
	
The International Yearbook ofEnvironmental andResource Economics
of the risk turns out to be correct. Mutual insurance contracts or mutual
compensation agreements are already part of our institutional framework.
They date back to the nineteenth century and beyond, and were the foun-
dations of many current insurance companies and trade unions . Consider,
for example, agricultural cooperatives, probably the oldest risk-allocation
institutions in the world. One of the largest banks in Italy, the Monte dei
Paschi dei Siena, was founded to play this role in 1473 . They have insured
against weather risks since then,? and have provided mutual insurance
contracts for their members, in that they have arranged transfers from the
less to the more fortunate in any given season, the size of the transfer
depending on the overall level of prosperity. They have also provided an
elementary form of insurance against the overall frequency of poor crop
yields in their community by building up reserves to carry over from good
to bad years. So they have actually fulfilled both of the insurance func-
tions outlined above - making transfers between agents contingent on the
overall incidence of negative events, and allowing a mechanism for trans-
ferring wealth between states in the sense of high or low overall incidences
of negative events in the population .
4.2 Trading Risks
An interesting aspect of the markets just described is that they can pro-
vide a natural mechanism for reconciling differences in assessments, and
for testing the conviction behind publicly stated positions.
For many years the US expressed disbelief about the likelihood of cli-
mate change . The European Union expressed the opposite belief. Then
through a market for securities whose payoffs depend on which descrip-
tion of climate change is correct, the US would naturally sell insurance to
the EU. The US would wish to be a seller of securities which pay if climate
change is serious, because of its belief that this event will not occur, and a
buyer of securities that pay if it is not, because of its belief that this will be
the outcome. The EU would be on the opposite sides of these markets.
International markets for the risks of climate change would also pro-
vide an objective test of the seriousness with which countries adhere to
their publicly professed positions on the risk of climate change. It is pos-
sible that a country might publicly profess to a lack of concern about the
risks of climate change, in spite of actually being concerned about these
risks, in order to `free ride' on C02 abatement policies introduced by
others. These issues are discussed in Chichilnisky and Heal (1992b) and
the references cited there. The existence of markets for the risks of cli-
mate change would place such a country in a dilemma. The country's true
beliefs would incline it to sell securities paying off' in the event of climate
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change not being serious, and buy those paying off if it is serious.
Consistency with its public positions would require that it be on exactly
the opposite sides of these markets. There would therefore be a cash cost
to convincing and consistent misrepresentation of true beliefs. These cash
costs could offset some of the incentive to free ride on other countries'
efforts to reduce greenhouse emissions (Chichilnisky and Heal 1992b) .
Note that trading risks is different from the trading of emission
permits. The recognition of uncertainty suggests the need to trade state-
contingent emission permits, where the state is defined in terms of the
frequency of climate-change-related events. Such contingent emission
permits could play the role of securities whose payoffs depend on scien-
tific uncertainty.
In the context of emission permits, it is worth noting that climate is a
public good . However, it does not fit fully the conventional paradigm
because emission abatement, which is the production of the public good
`unchanged climate', is conducted independently in the various countries
of the world . It is not produced in a central production facility, as
assumed in the usual treatments of public goods. A consequence is that
economic efficiency will only imply equalization of the marginal costs of
emission abatement across countries if lump-sum transfers between coun-
tries are made to equalize the marginal utility of income in all countries.
Equalization of the marginal costs of emission abatement across coun-
tries is often taken as justification of the superiority of tradable permits
as a method for controlling emissions. This point is developed in
Chichilnisky (1994b) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) . More generally, a
key issue is that an efficient allocation of a public good such as
unchanged climate is achieved through a Lindahl equilibrium and not a
competitive equilibrium . In general, competitive markets for tradable
emission permits may not decentralize Pareto-efficient allocations of
abatement (Chichilnisky, Heal and Starrett, 1993).
5 OPTIMAL ALLOCATION WITH ENDOGENOUS RISKS
What is it worth spending to reduce the probability of harmful climate
change? Only if we can answer this question can we judge properly pro-
posals for carbon taxes, alternative energy strategies, and C02reduction
protocols. Careful judgement is crucial, as all of these involve very con-
siderable costs, as indicated by Cline (1992) and others. Here I summarize
two approaches to this problem, a market approach based on
Chichilnisky (1996e) and a growing economy approach based on Heal
(1984, 1990).
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5.1 Markets with Endogenous Uncertainty: Theory and Policy
The following extends Arrow-Debreu markets to encompass risks
induced by the functioning of the economy itself. Examples are the
risks of atmospheric and climate change induced by CFC and CO2
emissions. Economic actions - the consumption and production of
goods and services - induce uncertainty, because they are connected
with carbon emissions that could alter the atmosphere and potentially
change the climate.
Traders maximize expected utility. Their expected utility, however,
changes with the aggregate level of output of the economy, because
expected utility depends on the probability of the different events, and
these change with the activity of the economy.
In this section, endogenous uncertainty is classified into two types: sci-
entific uncertainty, which is uncertainty about the impact of production
on climate states and their probabilities, and strict endogenous uncertainty
which is about equilibrium levels of outputs. Below, I formalize a com-
petitive equilibrium with endogenous uncertainty, show that the markets
with endogenous uncertainty are typically incomplete, and that the equi-
librium allocations are only efficient in a restricted sense. Scientific
uncertainty can be fully hedged by financial innovation, for example,
CAT Futures, which are new financial instruments recently introduced on
the Chicago Board of Trade. However, uncertainty induced by the
unknown level of output at an equilibrium, which is strict endogenous
uncertainty, cannot be hedged fully. It leads to incomplete markets where
the equilibria are not Pareto efficient :
Definitions
A market economy E has Ha 2 traders, and J z 1 firms which produce
Na 1 commodities over T periods of time. There are S states of exoge-
nous uncertainty. To simplify the exposition, and to isolate the essential
features of endogenous uncertainty, the formulation of the market E is
identical to the classic Arrow-Debreu formulation in every possible way
except in the treatment of uncertainty. All traders in E are competitive,
and there is symmetric information.$
There is a complete set of assets to hedge exogenous uncertainty. Each
asset pays in terms of a numeraire good n, and the span of the economy's
asset matrix is S. Each trader h has an initial endowment of goods and
assets, S2h E RM whereM=N x S, an initial endowment 6h = (6 h . . . 8h)
of shares in J firms. The economy has a complete set of markets for
exogenous uncertainty and is equivalent to a standard Arrow-Debreu
economy with commodity space RM and no uncertainty; to simplify
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matters and without loss of generality I consider such an economy from
now on .9 The economy's technology is described within every state s = 1
. . . S by a given production possibility set YS C R, and
Y= IS = i YCRM. (7 .1)
Each price vector p is in OM= [(pl .. . pM) ERM : pi a 0 and 2pi = 1] .
Endogenous uncertainty
The economy E discussed until now is identical to an Arrow-Debreu
market with production and with exogenous uncertainty about acts of
nature . This subsection introduces a new aspect : endogenous uncer-
tainty, which goes beyond the Arrow-Debreu structure and yields
different properties.
To motivate the treatment of endogenous uncertainty in E, consider a
version of the environmental problem discussed above: each vector of
aggregate output of goods in the world economy induces a level of emis-
sions of C02 or of CFCs. Corresponding to each level of emissions new
states of nature may develop, for example a state where the ozone layer is
50 per cent damaged, or where there is a disruption of the planet's cli-
mate pattern known as global climate change. To formalize this, the
endogenous uncertainty in the economy E is described as follows : each
vector of aggregate production induces a set of states of finite
cardinality,l° {1 . . . D), which includes all the states of exogenous uncer-
tainty S and possibly more,II describing the risks which traders face.
In markets with exogenous uncertainty there exists either afixed prob-
ability distribution over the set S representing the relative frequencies of
the events in S, or alternatively different subjective distributions for dif-
ferent traders, each of which is also fixed. Here, instead, the probabilities
over the states in D are variable : they vary in principle over all possible
probabilities over the set D, which is an infinite domain, and do so
according to the aggregate vector of output in the economy.
Definition 1 For each aggregate production vector y ERM there exists
a finite set of states e (y) of cardinality not exceeding D > S, e (y) C {1
. . . D}, and a probability density over these states, n(y) = {nJE-e(y , such
that Vi x~ > 0, and Ele(i)n; (y) = 1 . The set of states e (y) and the ensity
function n(y) describe the endogenous uncertainty of the economy E at
the aggregate production vector yE RM.
Assumption 1 There exists a C2 function T assigning to each vector
y E Y of aggregate output in the economy a vector T(y) in the unit
simplex OD, the positive components of which represent possible states
of uncertainty and their respective probabilities:
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T= (T1, . . ., TD) : RM -AD
AD = [(n, .. . xD) : n, z 0 and
jD= l nl =1]
and if 11y'll > Ilyll then
minl(nl) > minj(n'), where
n (Y) = {nl} and
n (Y,) = {n'j .
Market equilibrium with endogenous uncertainty
How do rational traders behave when facing endogenous uncertainty?
This depends on the structure of information of the economy. Assume
the simplest possible structure in order to isolate the essential features of
the problem.
The structure of information What do traders know about endogenous
uncertainty? In our model they know that it exists and no more. We are
concerned with market equilibria, not with the process by which the
economy arrives at one. The discovery process leading to an equilibrium
with endogenous uncertainty parallels the treatment of price discovery in
Arrow-Debreu theory. 13 There is no assumption about perfect foresight,
nor any other form of expectations.
" Assumption 2 Each competitive trader considers the world's endogenous
uncertainty states e(y) and their probabilities W (y) as independent of
her or his individual actions .
This is a realistic assumption in economies where uncertainty has some
of the characteristics of a `public good': the intuition is that traders are
'small' so that while the aggregate output of the economy does affect
endogenous uncertainty, each trader takes the world's endogenous uncer-
tainty as a parameter. This is similar to the situation with respect to prices
in the standard competitive markets: each trader takes prices as given even
though everyone's actions determine the prices at an equilibrium.
The trader's choice under endogenous uncertainty Having established
the structure of information, the trader's problem of choice under
uncertainty is straightforward . Under the standard von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms for choice under uncertainty:
" Assumption 3 For any given price vector p E 0 M and any given set of
states of endogenous uncertainty 14 e C {1 . . . D} with probabilities
JnJieDl trader chooses a consumption vector D,(p) = (dl . . . dD) E
RMxD which maximizes the expected utility of consumption
where the maximization is restricted to the set of consumption vectors zi
(p) which have a value equal to that of the trader's endowments plus the
trader's share of profits:
D
	
D
< P, z,O)> _ < PQh > + 8h(P)'
i=t i=t
(7.4)
Since the traders treat the probabilities ni as given, for each trader h the
maximization problem (7.3)-(7.4) has a unique solution as a function of
the price vector p when uh is strictly concave.
Definition 2 An economy E with endogenous uncertainty has Htraders,
J profit-maximizing firms which produce Mgoods, a production tech-
nology Yas described above, and a structure of uncertainty described by
a function T : Rm - OD, where for every y E Y the set of states of
endogenous uncertainty T (y) - Sis not a singleton,15 with preferences as
described in (7.3) above, and satisfying Assumptions 1-3. Other technical
assumptions are in Chichilnisky (1996e : 105-9).
Existence of a competitive equilibrium with endogenous uncertainty
The following definition of a competitive equilibrium with endogenous
uncertainty formalizes the notion that the states of endogenous uncertainty
and their probabilities are determined as part of the equilibrium concept:
Definition 3 A competitive equilibrium with endogenous uncertainty is : a
price vector p* E OM, an aggregate production level of the economy y*
E Y, a set of states of endogenous uncertainty e * , e * C {1 . . . D}, each
state with a corresponding probability x! > 0, i E e*, Iiee* n~ =1, and
for each trader h a consumption vector dh(P*) E RMXD, Vi E e*d' (P*)
ERm. such that :
1 . For each trader h the consumption vector dh(p*) is optimal for prob-
lem (7 .3) with constraint (7.4), for the set of endogenous states e*
with associated probabilities n!,, i E e* .
2. The aggregate production vector y* is profit maximing within Y at
the equilibrium prices p*: y* = y (p*) .
3. All markets clear at each state i of endogenous uncertainty:
H
Vi E e *,l dh (p*, n) - S2 h = yi(p*),
h=1
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t
niuh (zi(p))
i=t i=t
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and the states of endogenous uncertainty with probabilities {nI} ice*
are precisely those states and those probabilities which are induced by
the aggregate production of the economy at the equilibrium: {ni } iEe'
-_ T(P
.
) .
The existence of a market equilibrium with endogenous uncer-
tainty has been established under general conditions and generically
on technologies :
Theorem 4 There exists a competitive equilibrium for a market with
endogenous uncertainty generically on technologies.
Proof See Chichilnisky (1996e, p.123).
Risk allocation with endogenous uncertainty
In markets with endogenous uncertainty the concept of Pareto efficiency
can be ambiguous. This is because the traders' von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences are defined with reference to the probabilities of
the events and these change with the overall level of economic activity.
Within Arrow-Debreu markets these are either subjective or objective
probabilities, but in any case fixed. Here matters are quite different. The
probabilities are now endogenously defined as part of an equilibrium .
Therefore the traders' preferences themselves vary with the equilibrium,
and Pareto efficiency of an allocation becomes a self-referential concept,
in the sense that the allocation itself helps determine whether it is more or
less valuable than other allocations.
It is, however, possible to define a restricted concept of efficiency in
markets with endogenous uncertainty:
Definition S An allocation of the economy E is a vector x E RMXH;
where x = (xh)h=i . . . H, xh E RM"D, it is called feasible if h = t (xh - Qh)
E Y, that is, when the sum of what is allocated in excess of the econ-
omy's endowments can be produced .
Definition 6 A feasible allocation x = (xh)h=1 . .. HE RMXD in E is called
exogenously Pareto efficient when it is Pareto efficient relative to allo-
cations according to the same preferences prevailing at x. That is, when
there exists no other feasible allocation y = v"~, 'h)h=1 . . . H E RMXD in E
such that for all h,
with strict inequality for some h .
e(y) e(y)
nl(X)uh(yh) z 1: nl(X)uh(Xh)
i=1 i=1
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Theorem 7 A competitive equilibrium of a market with endogenous
uncertainty is exogenously Pareto efficient .
Proof This follows immediately from the first welfare theorem.
Financial innovation and endogenous uncertainty
In the previous sections we saw that markets with endogenous uncertainty
have competitive equilibria generally, and these define exogenously Pareto-
efficient allocations. However, markets with endogenous uncertainty have
generally Pareto-inefficient equilibria . One reason is that markets with
endogenous uncertainty have no financial assets to hedge endogenous
uncertainty. Traders know that at the equilibria different states and proba-
bilities exist, and act appropriately, but they have no means to transfer
wealth across states of endogenous uncertainty:
Proposition 8 The market with endogenous uncertainty E is incom-
plete, in the sense that it has no assets to hedge endogenous
uncertainty, that is, no assets which pay contingent on the realizations
of endogenously induced risks .
Financial innovation
It seems natural to introduce new assets which pay contingent on the real-
ization of endogenous uncertainty. The introduction of new assets is
called ffinancial innovation.
In standard markets with exogenous uncertainty and incomplete asset
structures (Chichilnisky and Heal 1996) it is always possible to complete
the market by introducing new assets. Through the introduction of Arrow
securities which allow the transfer of wealth across states between which
this was not possible before, markets can be completed. When all possible
such assets have been introduced, one says that the markets have been com-
pleted . By definition, a completed market economy has the structure of an
Arrow-Debreu (complete) market :
Definition 9 A standard market economy with exogenous uncertainty
which has S states of nature and where it is not possible to shift income
across S - T of its states (the span of its asset matrix is T < S) is called
incomplete . The act of introducing S - T Arrow securities each of which
pays a unit of a numeraire in each of the S- Tstates and zero in all others
is called completing the market. A completed market is by definition one
which is identical to a standard Arrow-Debreu model. In particular, a com-
petitive equilibrium of such a completed market is always Pareto efficient .
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In parallel with the results just quoted on incomplete markets with
exogenous uncertainty, I explore the possibility of completing the mar-
kets for endogenous uncertainty. Each endogenous risk is represented by
an (endogenously determined) probability function n over events in the
set D; therefore one should ideally aim at introducing financial instru-
ments which pay contingent on such distributions. The assets we have in
mind mimic Arrow securities, but their payoffs are contingent on proba-
bilities : they pay a unit of the numeraire if one probability arises and zero
otherwise. Since we have assumed that there is no problem of informa-
tion, it should be possible to introduce and trade such instruments . The
matter may appear at first sight to be somewhat theoretical; for this
reason it is desirable to discuss a practical example where similar instru-
ments were introduced and are currently traded.
CAT Futures and catastrophe bundles
Assets which pay contingent on the observed frequencies of occurrence
of natural events, were first introduced and analysed in Chichilnisky and
Heal (1992a, 1992b and 1998). Assets which pay contingent on the real-
ization of frequencies of natural risks have been recently introduced in
the Chicago Board of Trade, called CAT (Catastrophe) Futures. These
instruments' payoffs depend inter alia on the incidence of tropical storms
in the United States, as measured, for example, by the Insurance Service
Organization index. The catastrophes contemplated in CAT futures
include earthquakes on the West coast, tornadoes on the East coast and
floods in the Midwest. The frequencies of these events are unknown, and
therefore these frequencies are treated as risks.
Chichilnisky and Heal (1992a) and Chichilnisky (1997b) showed under
general conditions that such instruments improve welfare in markets with
unknown risks, that is, where the probabilities or frequencies of the
events are unknown . Furthermore, Chichilnisky (1995, 1996h, 1997a,
1998) showed that a specific combination of mutual insurance and securi-
ties called `catastrophe bundles' is the most simple and efficient
instrument to hedge such risks.
Floods, earthquakes and tornadoes are all exogenous physical events;
they are not risks induced by economic actions. Our markets, instead,
face endogenous risks. This difference is an important one, as the follow-
ing result shows :
Theorem 10 It is not possible to complete a market for endogenous
uncertainty.
Proof This theorem was established formally in Chichilnisky (1996e);
an intuitive explanation follows. Consider an economy with endoge-
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nous uncertainty. Assume that all possible contracts contingent on all
probabilities {ni}iED over the sets of states {1 . . . D) have been intro-
duced. Equivalently, traders now can trade contingent on the
realization of each possible probability distribution {niI ED . The
assumption that the market has been completed leads to a contradic-
tion . If the market were now complete, then by definition it could reach
an allocation corresponding to that of an Arrow-Debreu economy with
complete asset markets. This implies that the traders must be fully
ensured across states of endogenous uncertainty, namely that at such an
equilibrium allocation x* , for each trader h, xh* = xih* at any two states i
;d j (Chichilnisky and Heal 1994 and Chichilnisky 1996e) . But this
implies that for each of the two states of endogenous uncertainty i, j
each trader has the same consumption vector; therefore the aggregate
production of the economy must be the same, y,* = yt*. Since the mapT
= (Ti .. . 'I'D) : R" - AD is a function for each d = 1 . . . D, this implies
that any two Pareto-efficient allocations lead to the same state of
endogenous uncertainty and the same probabilities prevail over these
two states. Since this is true for any two states of endogenous uncer-
tainty, this implies that the economy does not have endogenous
uncertainty, a contradiction . Therefore a market with endogenous
uncertainty cannot be completed . 0
Policy conclusions : the cost of climate risks
Chichilnisky (1997a) formulated and proved the existence of a competitive
equilibrium in markets with endogenous uncertainty, where the traders'
actions induce changes in the state spaces which represent uncertainty, and
in the probabilities of the states . The equilibria exist very generally.
Markets with endogenous uncertainty are incomplete. The incompleteness
is not assumed; it is proved . It derives from the nature of endogenous
uncertainty and it cannot be circumvented . There is no way to complete
the market with endogenous uncertainty no matter how many securities
are added to it . This is different from the standard literature on incomplete
markets in which the incompleteness is assumed and can easily be
removed by adding more securities (see Chichilnisky and Heal 1993).
I formulate here a specific instrument to improve the allocation of risk
in these incomplete markets: assets which pay contingent on probability
distributions over states. Such assets exist in practice although they have
been introduced recently. As mentioned above, they were anticipated in
Chichilnisky and Heal (1992a, 1992b), and are currently trading in the
Chicago Board of Trade under the name CAT Futures. More recently,
Chichilnisky (1995, 1996c, 1996e) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1998)) intro-
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duced a more sophisticated instrument, catastrophe bundles, and proved
that it is the most efficient instrument to hedge catastrophic risks for which
there are several possible priors. I showed above that they lead to Pareto-
efficient risk allocation with `scientific risks', but do not fully hedge `strict
endogenous uncertainty' .
A different policy aspect arises in the case of hedging environmental
risks which are the byproduct of industrial activity. Here the situation is
more favourable : if one seeks constrained Pareto efficiency, it is possible to
compute precisely the cost which is worth incurring to decrease the proba-
bility of an environmental risk . Assuming a known (or even an
approximately known) scientific relation between industrial output y and
the probability distribution of the different events (that is, the map T
defined above) one computes the manifold of equilibria of the economy
with endogenous uncertainty, and finds within it a new equilibrium with
the desired value. At this new equilibrium one computes the utility levels
achieved by the traders at their new consumption; the difference in the
welfare of the traders at the first and at the second equilibrium provides
an upper bound (or ceiling) to the willingness to pay for a decreased risk .
5.2 A Growing Economy with Endogenous Uncertainty
Endogenous uncertainty is also present in risk allocation through time .
The following provides a framework for a growing economy in which the
consumption of fossil fuels should be curtailed because it increases the
probability of a change in climate. The economy has three main character-
istics. First, the atmosphere may be in one of two states, one favourable to
economic activity and one unfavourable (there is a possibility of a future
climate change). The favourable and unfavourable states are denoted Af
and Au, respectively. Second, the atmosphere transits stochastically from
the favourable state to the unfavourable, and once there remains there for
ever, so that atmospheric change is irreversible: AU is an absorbing state .
The probability of transiting to the unfavourable state is endogenous and
increases with the level of cumulative emissions from the use of fossil fuels .
Fossil fuels (use rate R), capital equipment (stock K) and the atmos-
phere (A = Af or AU) are used to produce output Qt, which may be
consumed Ct or reinvested K, to augment the capital stock. Production
generates emissions, which affect the probability of a change in the state
of the atmosphere. The atmosphere is a resource that enters into the
economy's production function, which may be in a favourable or an
unfavourable state. Initially the atmosphere is in the favourable state but
may change stochastically to the unfavourable state, and once in this state
will remain there for ever. The source of emissions forever is the use of an
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exhaustible resource in production. The remaining input to production is
the capital stock. An obvious example of this structure is the emission of
C02 generated by the use of fossil fuels.
Qt =Q(Kt,R1,A)=Cr +K r
A =AforAu
Q (Kr, Rr, Af) > (Kr, Rr, A) for all Kr, Rr.
The probability of a change of atmospheric state depends on cumula-
tive emissions, and emissions are assumed proportional to current use of
the fossil fuel. For simplicity we therefore identify emissions and fossil
fuel consumption Rt. Let
r
Zr =J'Rzdz,d
Z'R= r .
0
The evolution of the climate is as follows. There is a date T > 0 such that
A = AP t < T, and A = Au , t > T. Here T is a random variable whose
marginal density function fhas as its argument cumulative emissions
Zr, f=f(Z). The probability that the climate changes, that is, the date T
occurs, in an interval (t l , t2), is
Zr2
PrTE (t l , t2) = f f(Z) dt.
Zrl
It follows that if Zrl = Zr2, so that there is no depletion or emission in
the interval (t,, t2) , then the probability of climate change in that interval
is zero. When there is emission in an interval (t l , t2), the chance of climate
change depends on emissions in that interval and also on cumulative
emissions up to that interval . All of this makes good sense.
Output may be consumed or invested. Consumption yields utility and the
objective is to maximize the expected present discounted utility of consump-
tion . There is a constraint on the total amount of the resource that can be
used, as this is exhaustible. The problem involves maximizing expected util-
ity subject to the resource and national income constraints, where the
expectation is over the process governing climate change. Formally:
climate, T.
00
maxEfU (C,)e-ar dt
0
00
s.t. fRrdt s S0
0
Kr = Q(K1, Rr, A) _ Cr
The expectation here is over the distribution of the date of change of the
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For this problem, Heal (1984, 1990) characterizes optimal paths of
consumption, capital accumulation and use of fossil fuel. He compares
these with those that are optimal in the absence of an atmospheric
impact, and also studies the impact of changes in parameters such as the
discount rate and degree of risk aversion . He isolates the key parameters
in determining the optimal rate of use of fossil fuels .
The introduction of atmospheric impact makes a difference. The time
profile of resource use which emerges is flatter than that which emerges
from an optimal depletion problem with no atmospheric impact. Initial
levels of resource use are lower, and they fall more slowly, than with no
atmospheric impact . The difference depends on the degree of risk aver-
sion and on the parameters of the probability distribution relating
cumulative emission to climate change .
The behaviour of the shadow price of the resource is also of interest .
In the pure depletion case this price rises at the rate of discount; in
Heal (ibid.) it may fall and even become negative . We can interpret
the difference between the shadow price of the resource in the no-atmos-
pheric-impact case and the current case as an optimal carbon tax. This tax
depends on the country's degree of risk aversion and on the parameters of
the probability distribution describing the risk of climate change as a
function of carbon emissions, as well as on the damage resulting from
climate change . The model thus leads to a distinctive approach to charac-
terizing an optimal carbon tax and its evolution over time . Hartwick
(1992) gives an analysis of carbon taxes using this framework.
The likelihood of climate change as a function of economic activity is
a key relationship in evaluating the choices posed in this model. This is a
functional relationship rather than a parameter. Global change R&D
leads us to a better understanding of this relationship . It is worth stress-
ing that proper economic analysis requires not just the likelihood of
climate change as a result of one particular emission scenario, which is
what most scientific analyses provide, but rather a systematic evaluation of
how the nature and likelihood of climate change varies with the pattern of
economic activity . The study and characterization of this likelihood func-
tion is an important topic for interdisciplinary research .
It is not surprising that what it is worth paying to reduce the risk of
climate change depends inter alia on a society's degree of risk aversion
and discount rate . However, this has an interesting implication . Even
if there were complete agreement about all of the scientific aspects
of the global change problem, there could still be disagreement about
policy responses . Because of the international externalities associated
with climate, so that all countries consume the same climate,
COZ abatement policies only make sense if coordinated internationally
(see Heal 1992) .
Different countries' positions with respect to measures to restrict
greenhouse gas emissions depend on their discount rates and degrees of
risk aversion . The US, for example, has been against global abatement
agreements, while Germany has been in favour. This fits with the con-
ventional wisdom that the financial and industrial community in the US
have both a higher discount rate and a lower degree of risk aversion
(greater willingness to take risks) than those in Germany. The differ-
ences in policy positions could then be attributed to differences in
preferences rather than, or in addition to, different interpretations of
the current scientific evidence . Figure 7.2 portrays such an interpreta-
tion of differences in the attitudes underlying policy choices towards
global warming.
US :
high discount,
low risk aversion
" Europe :
low discount,
high risk aversion
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Risk aversion
Figure 7.2 Possible systematic differences in parameters determining
attitudes towards the risk of climate change
Different perceptions of the risk involved do not, however, preclude
efficient solutions. Differences in preferences can lead to gains from trade.
In this case differences in attitudes towards risk could be grounds for the
introduction of markets in which different risk positions are traded, with
efficiency gains, see Chichilnisky and Heal (1992b).
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6 OPTION VALUES AND IRREVERSIBILITY
A central issue in valuing environmental resources such as current climate
conditions, biodiversity, or complex ecological systems, is the irreversibil-
ity of decisions and events . An aspect of these resources is that once
altered they cannot easily be restored to their current conditions, at least
on a relevant timescale. The decision not to preserve a rich reservoir of
biodiversity such as the 60 million-year-old Korup forest in Nigeria is
irreversible . The alteration or destruction of a unique asset of this type
has an awesome finality, and analysts have sought to capture this in a
framework for cost-benefit analysis. This has led to the concept of
`option value' : preserving a unique asset in its present state allows us the
possibility of changing our minds later. Altering it irreversibly does not.
Preserving it has thus to be credited with an `option value' because it
keeps open to us the option of reconsidering our decision . Altering it
leaves us no such option in the future.
A concept related to option value is that of `nonuse' or existence value.
We may value environmental goods for which we have no immediate
economic use. The existence of certain species is in this category : the
Californian condor, the spotted owl, and various snails and fish come to
mind . There is no sense in which we can currently use these species: possi-
bly one could argue that the condor and the owl have consumption value
for those willing to make the effort needed to see them, but few people
come into this category. One doubts that this is a significant issue with
the snail .
The two concepts, option value and nonuse value, seem to overlap.
Many goods which exemplify one also exemplify the other. At the same
time, there are no doubt differences. Nonuse values stem in some degree
from ethical considerations, from a recognition that a species has a right to
exist even if humanity places no direct value on it . But one suspects that
behind many nonuse valuations there lurks an option value: many nonuse
valuations stem from an unstated belief that a use value may emerge.
This section reviews two distinct formulations of this issue, one in which
the returns to a preservation project are uncertain at present but will be
revealed in the future, and one in which the preferences of future generations
for environmental facilities are uncertain. The first framework is the onein
which the issue of option values has traditionally been studied. I provide an
outline of the argument and show that one needs three conditions for an
option value to exist . These are irreversibility, the acquisition of information
with the passage of time, and an asymmetry of the underlying probability dis-
tribution. Similar results apply to the case of uncertainty about the
preferences of future generations (Beltratti, Chichfnisky and Heal, 1998).
6.1 Waiting for Information
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The option value of preserving an environmental or ecological asset has
been explored in the context of uncertainty about the future benefits
associated with its existence. A review of the literature is in Fisher and
Krutilla (1985). 16 The main issue is that there are benefits that will accrue
in the future from the preservation of a resource, but these are currently
unknown. If the resource is preserved into the future, then in the future
the decision about whether to preserve it can be reconsidered in the light
of better information then available about the benefits from its existence .
If it is not preserved, then there is no chance of reconsideration when we
have better information . In this case conventional decision rules will
underestimate the value of preserving the asset. The following example
(from Dasgupta and Heal 1979) illustrates the key point in a simple
framework. It is illustrated in Figure 7 .3 .
benefit ho
probability (1-p)
benefit b2
Figure 7.3 The benefitsfrom conservation in different states
Below I shall show that with irreversible decisions there is an option
value to conservation in the initial period if and only if there is a positive
expected payoff from conservation in that period given that we follow an
optimal policy. I contrast this with the reversible case, in which one never
conserves in the first period and there is no option value.
Consider two dates, t = 0 and t = 1 . We have one unit of an environ-
mental asset. The benefit from preserving this at time t = 0 is bo . At time t
= 1 there are two possible states of nature s, and s2 . The state of nature is
revealed at time t = 1 . If the state is sl , the benefit of preserving the asset is
b l : if s2 is the state, the benefit is b2 . The probabilities of sl and s2 are p
and (1 -p), respectively. Decisions about preservation are made at times t
= 0 and t = 1 . At t = 0 a decision is made on how much of the asset to pre-
serve until t = 1 : at that date we may either conserve everything conserved
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at t= 0, or conserve less . Given that destruction is irreversible, we cannot
at t = 1 conserve more than was conserved at t = 0. Our options at t = 1
are therefore constrained by the decision made at t = 0. These data are
summarized in Figure 7.3 .
Compare the case already described, where the decision made at time t
= 0 is irreversible, with an alternative case in which this decision can be
reversed . In this case the decision made at time t = 0 no longer constrains
the options available at time t = 1 . Let us look at this alternative case
first, as it is simpler and provides a benchmark. Let co be the amount of
the resource conserved at time t = 0, and c, and c2 be the amounts con-
served at time t = 1 in states 1 and 2, respectively. The expected benefit
from development (assuming a zero discount rate) is
boco +pbicl + (1-p)b2c2'
One has to choose conservation levels co, cl and c2 to maximize (7.5) .
Assume that there is currently no benefit to preservation,l 7 bo < 0, nor is
there any benefit in state 1 in the future, b, < 0. However, there is the possi-
bility of state 2 in which there are positive benefits from preservation, that is,
b2 > 0. If decisions are reversible, we conserve nothing at time t = 0, that is,
we set co = 0. Then at time t = 1, we conserve nothing in state 1 and every-
thing in state 2, that is, we set c, = 0 and c2 = 1 . In the reversible case we can
set c2 = 1 because by assumption decisions made at t = 0 are reversible.
Now consider the real case in which the decision at time t = 0 cannot be
reversed later. In this case the choice made at t = 0 does constrain the
choices open at t = 1 . We have to satisfy the constraint that what is con-
served at time t = 1 cannot exceed that which was conserved initially, that
is, 0 s c,, c2 s co s 1 . In particular, if everything is destroyed in the first
period, then we have no options in the second . What policies now maxi-
mize (7 .5)? Is there a value to carrying the option to conserve into the
second period? Clearly if in the second period the state of the world is one
in which there are positive benefits to conservation, then we will conserve
everything left to us by our earlier decisions, that is, we will always set c2 =
co. If, however, the state is unfavourable to conservation, then we shall
conserve nothing and set cl = 0. Hence the maximand (7.5) reduces to
[bo + (1 -p)b2]co +pbici = [bo + (1-p)b2]co
and the initial conservation level is positive if and only if
[bo + (1 -p)b2] > 0.
(7.5)
(7.6)
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The inequality (7.6) has a simple interpretation : the left-hand side is the
expected payoff from conservation in the first period. It is the certain
payoff in the first period plus the expected payoff from conservation in
the second, given that if the state unfavourable to conservation occurs
there will be no conservation in the second period . It is the expected
payoff to conservation in period one given that an optimal policy is
followed subsequently.
It is optimal to conserve in the first period if and only if there is a
positive expected payoff from conservation given that we follow an
optimal policy. Contrast this with the decision in the reversible case, in
which we never conserve and always choose co = 0 . These two decisions
are different if the expected payoff to conservation in the first period is
positive . 18 In this case there is an option value to conservation as
a means of carrying the resource into the second period and taking
advantage of future information.
6.2 Option Values and the Value of Information
The existence of an `option value' 19 does not depend on risk aversion .2o
The key issues are: first, the irreversibility of the decision ; second, the fact
that delaying a decision can let one take advantage of better information ;
and third, the asymmetry represented by (7.6) . This latter condition
implies that on average there will be benefits from conservation in the
first period, provided that we choose optimally later .
Important practical implications flow from the analysis that we have
just completed. Climate change is likely to be irreversible if it occurs. So
in a cost-benefit analysis of preventing climate change (that is, preserving
the atmospheric environment), it may be appropriate to assign conserva-
tion (preventing climate change) an option value. This will be the case if
the passage of time is likely to bring significant new information about
the likelihood of climate change or about its consequences and the
expected payoffs satisfy (7.6) above.
A thorough study of the costs and benefits of reducing climate change
is in Cline (1992). It seems worth noting that although this study refers
many times to the scientific uncertainties associated with predicting cli-
mate change, it at no point attributes an option value to preservation,
that is, to preventing climate change . This means that it may systemati-
cally underestimate the benefit-cost ratio of preservation of the
atmosphere in its status quo. There is also an analysis in Marine and
Richels (1992) of the value of waiting for scientific information about the
greenhouse effect . They consider two possibilities: acting strongly now to
reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, or taking very limited action
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now and waiting until there is further scientific evidence . Taking major
steps towards emission abatement now amounts to conserving the atmos-
pheric environment in its present state, and should again be credited with
an option value. Manne and Richels fail to do this, and so again under-
estimate the value of buying insurance against the greenhouse effect by
acting strongly now. As the value of an option generally increases with
increasing uncertainty about the future, and as uncertainty looms large in
any projections regarding global warming, the extent of the underesti-
mate could be important.
6.3 Uncertainty about Future Generations
The concept of option value can be generalized or refined in several ways .
A key consideration seems to be the possibility that future generations
will value environmental resources more than we do. If this is simply a
statement that these resources will be scarcer, and so more valuable on
the margin, then this effect is captured in the usual approach to cost-ben-
efit analysis (see Heal 1992) .
It may, however, be a statement that future generations could have
different preferences from us, and might value environmental assets dif-
ferently. Because they might value them more, one should, it is argued,
attribute a value to leaving them the option of high consumption levels.
Solow (1992) argues that an important element in the definition of sus-
tainability -is recognizing the possibility that the preferences of future
generations about environmental assets may be different from ours . This
seems close to the concept of option value set out above, and indeed it is,
though there are some differences that are revealing. Recent results in
Beltratti et al . (1998)21 establish that uncertainty about future preferences
alone is not sufficient to produce an `option value' for increasing the
resource left to the next generation . In addition to pure uncertainty, there
must be asymmetry in the distribution of possible changes in preferences.
Neutral uncertainty, in the sense that increases and decreases in intensity
of preferences are equally likely, does not generate a case for leaving more
to the future in case their preferences for the resource are more intense
than ours . Uncertainty makes a case for conservation only when the
expected return to postponement of consumption is positive.
7 RESPONSES TO CATASTROPHIC RISKS
As already mentioned, traditional formulations of uncertainty do not
deal adequately with catastrophic risks, namely with low probability
events with major adverse consequences . Traditional decision theory, is
based on von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms . I show below why those
axioms are not adequate for ranking catastrophic risks . Then I introduce
and develop new axioms and derive the optimization criteria which they
imply, following Chichilnisky (1996f). Finally I discuss practical
responses to climate change that emerge from this analysis .
7.1 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Axioms
Mathematical axioms introduced half a century ago by John von Neumann
and Oscar Morgenstern gave rise to a now classical tool for decisionmaking
under uncertainty.22 The axioms give rise to procedures to rank or evaluate
risky outcomes. The von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) axioms provide a
mathematical formalization of how to rank lotteries. Optimization accord-
ing to such a ranking defines decisionmaking under uncertainty.
A system with uncertain characteristics can be in one of several possi-
ble states ; each state is represented by the value of a random variable. For
example, the average temperature of the planet's surface is a state.
For simplicity the system's states are described by real numbers. To
each state sE R there is an associated outcome, for example to each tem-
perature level there is an associated vector describing soil fertility, so that
one has f(s) E RN, N z 1 . A description of outcomes across all states is
called a `lottery' . A lottery is a function f : R- RN, and the space of all
lotteries is therefore a function space L.
A main result obtained from the VNM axioms is a representation the-
orem which characterizes all possible rankings satisfying their axioms .
These rankings are given by a specific type of functions W : L - R,
known as `von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utilities' . The decision
procedure obtained by optimizing such utilities is called `expected utility
maximization' and has the form,
where the line R is the state space, the variable x : R- RN is a lottery, u
RN - R is a (bounded) utility function describing the utility provided by
the outcome of the lottery in each state s, u(s), and where the measure
d~t(x) is a probability distribution over measurable subsets of states in R.
According to the VNM representation theorem, rational choice under
uncertainty must take the following form: a lottery x is ranked above
another y if and only if Wassigns to x a larger real number, that is,
where Wsatisfies (7 .7).
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W(x) =fsER u[x(s)]d[t(s) (7.7)
x z yp W(x) > W(V),
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The optimization of expected utility is a widely used procedure for
,valuating choices under uncertainty. Functions such as W are amenable
o a large body of knowledge which goes back several centuries : the cal-
:ulus of variations. The Euler-Lagrange equations are typically used to
haracterize optimal solutions. Such mathematical tools are widely used
o find and describe choices under uncertainty.
'.2 Catastrophic Risks
)espite their frequent use, the classic methods defined above are not ade-
uate for lotteries involving catastrophic risks. The reasons are both
Iractical and theoretical . From the practical point of view, it has been
hown that using such criteria undervalues catastrophic risks and hence
onflicts with the observed evidence of how humans evaluate such risks
'-hichilnisky 1996f; Lowenstein and Thaler 1989 ; Lowenstein and Elster
992) . For example, using VNM utilities, the most damaging scenarios of
lobal climate change induce little if any economic loss. The
.itergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the main interna-
onal scientific organization in this area, recently predicted a highly
untested figure of about 2 per cent loss of economic value from a dou-
ling of C02 concentration in the atmosphere. This is a symptom of a
lore general phenomenon: a simple computation shows that the hypo-
ietical disappearance of all irrigation water in the US and all the
)untry's agricultural produce would have at most a 2.5 per cent impact
n its gross domestic product (Cline 1992). This finding underscores the
nportance of using appropriate criteria for evaluating catastrophic risks .
Mathematically the problem is that the measure [t which emerges from
ie VNM representation theorem is countably additive . Since the utility
Lnction u : RN --> R is bounded (super u(x)) <oo, the countable additiv-
y of [t implies that any two lotteries x, y E L are ranked by Wquite
dependently of the utility of the outcome in states whose probabilities
-e lower than some threshold level E > 0, where E depends on x and y.23
ich a function is called `insensitive to small probability events' .
)rmally:
Definition 11 The function Wis called insensitive to small probability
events if
W(x)> W(y)<*, 36>OE=E(x,y) : W(x')>W(y) (7.8)
>r every x' and y' such that
= x and y'= y a.e. on a set ACR, p, (Ac) < E .
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This means that Wranks x above y if and only if it ranks x' above y' for
any pair of lotteries x' andy' which are obtained by modifying arbitrarily x
and y in sets of states A with probability lower than E .24 The interpretation
of this property is that the ranking defined by Wis `insensitive' to the out-
comes of the lottery in small probability events. The following result shows
whyVNM utilities are not adequate for evaluating catastrophic risks .
Lemma 12 Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities are insensitive to
low probability events. Therefore they are not adequate for ranking
catastrophic risks .
Proof Consider two lotteries x, y E L, where x is superior to y accord-
ing to a VNM utility W. Formally :
Obviously
W(x) = f u[x(s)] dR(s) > W(y) = f u[y(s)]dR(s) .
sER seR
W(x) > W(y) e* 3a(x,y) > 0 : W (x) > W (y) + a.
To show that a VNM utility is insensitive to small probability events
we must show that the ranking between x and y is insensitive to the
outcomes in sets of small enough measure, say E, as defined in (7.8). 1
will show that W satisfies this property. Let E = a/3 .M, where M
>SupxER I u(x) 1 . Two new lotteries x' and y' are now obtained by alter-
ing arbitrarily the lotteries x and y, respectively, on two arbitrary sets
V, and V2, each of which has a measure smaller than E . Formally: x(s)
= As) a.e . in Vc, and y(s) = y' (s) a.e. in V2. By construction
and equally
reciprocally
I W(x) - W(x) I< f u[x(s)]d[u(s) < M. E s (x/3,
sEvl
W(y) - W(y) I < f u[y(s)]d!t(s) < M. E < a/3,
sEv2
Since W(x) > W(y) + a, it follows that
W(x) > W(y) =:> WV) > W(y');
W(x') > W(y) => W(x) > W(y)
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so that for the chosen c = e (x, y)
W(x) > W(y) < :- WO') > W(y'),
as we wished to prove. Since this is true for any two lotteries x and y, W
is insensitive to small probability events .
A consequence of this lemma is that VNM utilities are not well suited
for evaluating catastrophic risks. The problem is general. It can be shown
formally that cost-benefit analysis under uncertainty based on expected
utility maximization (which follows from VNM axioms) underestimates the
outcomes of small probability events . It is therefore biased against environ-
mental projects which are designed to avert catastrophic events.
Experimental evidence shows that humans treat choices under uncertainty
somewhat differently from what the VNM axioms would predict, suggest-
ing the need for alternative axioms which describe more accurately humans'
valuations (Lowenstein and Thaler 1989 ; Lowenstein and Elster 1992).
7.3 Updating Von Neumann-Morgenstern Axioms
Recently a new set of axioms was proposed to update VNM axioms for
catastrophic risks (Chichilnisky 1996f) . These axioms take a more bal-
anced approach towards small probability events. They contrast with
VNM axioms in the treatment of small probability events (ibid.) . On the
basis of these axioms a new representation theorem has been obtained
that fully characterizes the functions to be maximized under uncer-
tainty. 25 This defines a new decisionmaking tool, one that appears to
conform the evidence of how humans evaluate catastrophic risks
(Lowenstein and Thaler 1989; Lowenstein and Elster 1992).
7.4 New Axioms of Choice for Catastrophic Risks
The three axioms introduced in Chichilnisky (1996f) are simple . The first
axiom is standard, and is certainly satisfied by VNM utilities :
1 . continuity and linearity of the ranking of lotteries x with respect to the
utility u(x) .
The following two axioms are new; and the second axiom (2) is not satis-
fied by VNM utilities :
2. sensitivity to low probability events . This axiom rules out (7.8), as
defined below.
3. sensitivity to large probability events, as defined in (7 .9) below.
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Definition 13 A ranking is sensitive to low probability events when it
does not satisfy Definition 11 .
Definition 14 A ranking is said to be insensitive to large probability
events26 when
W(x) > W(y) eC, WV) > WV), (7.9)
for any two lotteries x' and y' that are obtained by modifying arbitrarily
x andy on a bounded set of states SCR of arbitrarily large probability.
Definition 15 A ranking is sensitive to large probability events when it
does not satisfy (7.9).
Example 16 The following is a ranking that concentrates on events of
vanishing probability and neglects large probability events. Define a
measure IA(s) on measurable sets of the line R as follows: every bounded
set has measure zero, and every complement of a bounded set has mea-
sure one. This is a finitely additive measure since the measure of a union
of finitely many disjoint sets is the sum of the measure of the sets .
However, it is not a countably additive measure, since the measure of
a union of countably many bounded sets which equals R is one,
and clearly this is different from the countable sum of the measure
of the bounded sets, which is zero . Define now the ranking
W(x) = sf~R u[x(s)]dR(s) . Such a function is insensitive to bounded sets of
events winch have positive probability according to any standard count-
ably additive measure of the line . Let LJR) be the set of measurable
and essentially bounded real valued functions on the line. The `dual' of
L, denoted L*, is the set of all real valued, continuous linear functions
on L . It has been shown (see, for example, Chichilnisky 19960 that this
dual contains two types of elements, both types being defined by mea-
sures on the line R: standard or `countably additive' measures, and
`purely finitely additive' measures. The latter assigns measure zero to any
bounded set in R, as is the case with the measure constructed in the
beginning of this example. Such measures define continuous, real valued
linear functions on lotteries in L., W : L -> R, called `integral opera-
tors', given by W(x) = I Ru[x(s)]dR(s) ; the measure [t (whether countably
or finitely additive) is called a `kernel' because of its role inside the inte-
grand in the definition of the operator W. Such functions on lotteries
satisfy (7 .9), and by definition they are insensitive to large probability
events. They are therefore ruled out by axiom (3) which requires sensitiv-
ity to large probability events. Indeed, such a function Wputs all the
`weight' on infinity, that is, on events which have arbitrarily small proba-
bilities according to any standard countably additive measure R on R.
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7.5 A New Representation Theorem
Like the VNM axioms, the new axioms defined here lead to a section
theorem. It has been shown in Chichilnisky (1996f) that there exist functions
T : L. - Rwhich rank all lotteries and satisfy all three axioms in 7.4 . As in
the VNM case, these are given by integral operators. However, rather than
having countably additive kernels as in the VNM representation, these func-
tions are a convex combination of integral operators with countably
additive measures and integral operators with purely finitely additive mea-
sures. Both measures (countably and finitely additive) are nonzero.
Theorem 17 There exist rankings of lotteries that satisfy the three
axioms (1), (2), (3). VNM expected utilities do not. Every ranking of
lotteries that satisfies the three axioms admits a representation by a
function W : LOO i R, of the form
W(x) = f u[x(s)]d[t(s) + 41 {u[x(s)]) .
sER
where [t is a standard countably additive measure on the reals R, f
dR(s) < oo, and where (D eL; is a purely finitely additive measure on R. I
Proof See Chichilnisky (1996a and f)
An example will fix ideas and illustrate the result .
Example 18 For simplicity, consider here discrete states indexed by the
integers Z. Now a lottery is an element of 1., the space of bounded
sequences of real numbers. Define a continuous linear functional on
lotteries T : h as follows:
T (x) = Y I f-S u[x(s)] + (1 - Y) liM s~00 u[x(s)], (7.10)
S=I
where 0 < Y < 1, and where lim S-". u[x(s)] is defined below. This function
satisfies all the axioms . The interpretation of the two parts of the func-
tion T in (7 .10) is as follows . The first part is an integral operator with an
integrable kernel {ks)se, which defines a countably additive measure on
Z, and therefore emphasizes the weight of large probability events in the
ranking of a lottery x E 1. The second part defines a purely finitely addi-
tive measure on Z which assigns positive weight to possible catastrophic
and small probability events . The second part of (7.10) ensures that no
matter how small is the probability that a limiting value will be achieved
by the lottery, the weight that this fact has in the criterion ensures that if
a lottery x is preferred to another y, changing the lottery x andy on a set
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of events of arbitrarily small probability can reverse the ranking.
Therefore the criterion is not insensitive to small probability events .
Formally, Lim,  is defined as the Hahn Banach extension of the stan-
dard limit function, extended using the Hahn Banach extension theorem
from the subset of sequences in 1. that do have a limit, to all of 1.. On the
sequences that have a limit, Limsy  u (x(s)) is the utility level correspond-
ing to the limiting value of the sequence.
Intuitively the second term in (7.10) defines a measure with `heavy tails' .
Since both parts are present in (7.10), the corresponding function T is
sensitive to small and to large probability events. Catastrophic risks are
therefore evaluated more realistically by such functions.
Remark 1 Observe that the second terms in (7.10) is a continuous function
on 1., with respect to the standard norm of 1., but does not admit a repre-
sentation as an expected value.27 The optimization of functions such as T
is not amenable to standard tools of calculus of variations. This must be
developed in new directions . Some results already exist (Chichilnisky
1996f), but much work is still needed.The study of optimal solutions of
these types of functions has led to asymptotically autonomous dynamical
systems, which occur naturally when one extends the Euler-Lagrange
analysis of optimal solutions to encompass the type of operators defined
here. Statistical analysis of such systems also requires new tools.
7.6 Responses to Catastrophic Climate Risks
How to employ the new criterion in hedging catastrophic risks? In practical
terms, what should one optimize under this criterion? Certainly we should
not maximize expected utility, since we have shown that it underestimates
catastrophes. The representation theoremprovided above gives us the clue: it
tells us what to optimize when making decisions involving catastrophic risks.
Example 19 The criteria derived from the axioms involve maximizing
a convex combination of expected value plus maximizing the infnnum
utility value that the lotteries can achieve, that is, averting the small
probability events that are the `catastrophes' . The behaviour of a ratio-
nal agent is therefore more conservative under these new criteria than
it is under the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms.
8 CONCLUSIONS ANDOPEN QUESTIONS
The foundations are in place for understanding the economics of global
environmental risks, but certain aspects require more attention.
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From a policy perspective, scientific uncertainty is one of the most
prominent issues . The risks we face are largely unknown: we do not know
the probability that the climate will warm up, or of its consequences.
Decisionmaking under these circumstances is a challenging endeavour. I
have proposed financial instruments to aid in this task, including a com-
bination of insurance and securities, called `catastrophe bundles'
(Chichilnisky 1995, 1996c, 1996h, 1997b and Chichilnisky and Heal 1997,
1998). These instruments work well under scientific uncertainty, but not
with strict endogenous uncertainty. An open question is how to extend
these results to the case where, in addition to the frequencies being
unknown, these frequencies are altered by human activity.
I have reviewed the use of options for handling irreversibilities, and
proposed a new type of options to hedge the risk that future generations
will have preferences different from our own. Option values can make our
behaviour more conservative. However, we do not know whether this is
true when future preferences change in a symmetric fashion: this is still an
open question .
Often the purpose of policy is to change the risks that we face. Examples
are policies that aim at decreasing the risk of climate change. There is an
explicit acknowledgement that we are facing endogenous risks, namely
risks that are responsive to our actions . Endogeneity is a fundamental fea-
ture of global environmental risks, one that is little understood and only
recently explored in economics. Traditional economic models for risk man-
agement, which take risks as exogenous, do not provide an adequate
framework for analysing and hedging global environmental risks. The
global carbon tax investigated by the OECD and reviewed in Chichilnisky
(1994b) is a policy designed to change the odds; another is the creation in
the Kyoto Protocol of global trading of permits for the emission of C02,
which was originally proposed in May 1994 to the FCCC by Chichilnisky
and Heal (1995) and Chichilnisky (1997) . The explicit objective of these
proposals is to decrease the risk of a climate change. A systematic study of
markets with endogenous risks started with the existence theorems in
Chichilnisky and Wu (1992), Chichilnisky (1992) and Chichilnisky et al .
(1996e) . Endogenous risks in connection with global warming have been
analysed within growing economies (Heal 1984).28 Two main results were
given in this chapter, one analysing the existence and welfare properties of
markets with endogenous uncertainty, and the other of growing economies
where productivity in the future changes with today's carbon emissions.
More work needs to be done in this area.
Another feature of global environmental risks is that they are corre-
lated, as they affect many indivduals at once . Therefore they cannot be
hedged solely by insurance, which is specifically designed for individual
risks and relies on the law of large numbers. Global environmental risks
can be catastrophic . Therefore traditional decision theory, which is based
on expected utility criteria and underestimates small probability events, is
not appropriate. I have proposed a new set of axioms to deal with cata-
strophic risks, derived the decision criteria that they imply and suggested
how to apply this to management of catastrophic risks. These criteria
have been applied to characterizing optimal behaviour in optimal growth
models with exhaustible resources and with renewable resources, and a
new `turnpike' theorem has been obtained (Chichilnisky 1997c and Heal
1997). More work remains to be done on the optimal management of cat-
astrophic risks.
NOTES
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1 . In medieval England, a peasant farmer's land was broken into many widely-dispersed
parcels . Economic historians interpret this as a way of hedging climate risk (see refer-
ences in Bromley 1992) . Land in different locations would be affected differently by
droughts, floods and frosts. By spreading land holdings over different locations, as well
as by organizing agricultural cooperatives, these societies hedged against climate risks.
2. The August 1997 issue of Science is dedicated to the topic of human-dominated eco-
systems.
3 . Human location is not the issue here. This is not about the choice of humans to settle
near natural hazards. This latter choice is important for human welfare, but it is not the
issue that drives today's global environmental concerns . Indeed, the human activity that
affects the atmosphere and the soil most is caused by humans who live elsewhere. Most
ecosystem destruction is for agricultural production and resource extraction for export to
far away lands. Many scientists believe that the separation of the location of the con-
sumers and the location of the producers, which may diminish sensitivity for the negative
`externalities' or environmental damage caused by resource extraction, leads to faulty
cost-benefit analysis and thus economic activity that is harmful to the environment.
4 . Endogeneity of risks leads to moral hazard when risks depend on actions which cannot be
observed by the insurers and will be influenced by the insurance offered. In the present
context such problems are not central to the analysis : asymmetric information is not a
characteristic of climate risks. Endogenous uncertainty is more general than moral hazard .
5 . In this respect there may be a difference between the various aspects of climate risk .
There are historical data on the relation between atmospheric COZ and climate from
tree-ring and ice-core studies. With ozone depletion the phenomenon is so new that
such data are not available .
6 . See Chichilnisky and Wu (1992), Chichilnisky (1992, 1996e, 1997a and b), Kurz (1974) .
7 . They also supported part of this research, when Chichilnisky held the Salinbemi Chair
at the University of Siena, 1995 .
8 . Therefore no `moral hazard' exists.
9 . A possible difference is that short sales on assets is generally allowed, while short sales
on real goods may be restricted . We can allow for this by enlarging the trading space to
include negative quantities of some of the commodities traded . In this case we must
require an additional condition for existence of a competitive equilibrium, see
Chichilnisky and Heal (1993).
10 . The cardinality of the set of states could be extended to be infinite without changing
the results in any way, but at the cost of more notation . In the case that the cardinality
is infinite one needs to work in economies with infinite dimensional commodity spaces,
ideally in Sobolev spaces ; see, for example, Chichilnisky and Heal (1993) for a general
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theorem of existence and characterization of a competitive equilibrium in Sobolev
spaces with or without short sales .
11 . It would suffice to consider the case where D = S because the case D > S can be reduced
to the former if we consider that the probabilities in the original Arrow-Debreu model
with exogenous uncertainty are zero outside the set s, that is, Hi q~ s, ni = 0 . However, it
seems preferable to keep a distinction between exogenous states and endogenous states.
12 . See Chichilnisky (1996e : 105) .
13 . For example, the endogenous states and their probabilities could be announced by an
auctioneer, as prices are announced by an auctioneer in a Walrasian market ; the role of
the Walrasian auctioneer is to ensure that no trading takes place until an equilibrium is
reached . The same here : the (expanded) role of the auctioneer is now to ensure that no
trading takes place until an equilibrium with endogenous uncertainty has been
reached. The auctioneer's announcements about sets of states and their probabilities
are neither correct nor false, in the same way that a Walrasian auctioneer announces
any prices, and not just the equilibrium prices. In the same vein, here the announced
states and probabilities may or not be the ones which will eventually emerge in a
market equilibrium .
14 . To simplify notation, and without loss of generality, we set from now on e = {l, . . ., D},
by allowing some probabilities n+ = 0 .
15 . That is3i,jET(y) - S,ixj,n i >0andnj >0.
16 . Among the studies of this issue are Weisbrod (1964), Krutilla (1967), Cichetti and
Freeman (1971), Schmalensee (1972), Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974) and
Bohm (1975) .
17 . If bo > 0, there are benefits to conservation in the first period, so that co = 1, that is, we
conserve in the first period . We concentrate on the interesting case of bo < 0, when the
only incentive to conserve in period 1 is the possibility of a positive return in period 2 .
18 . An important simplifying assumption in this example is the linearity of payoffs in the
level of preservation . Fisher and Krutilla (1985) discuss the role of linearity.
19 . Pindyck (1991) considers a similar example in the case of irreversible investment deci-
sions, and shows that the option value of delaying an investment decision to take
advantage of information that will become available in the future can be computed using
the formula used in finance for valuing an option to buy a stock. See also Dixit (1992) .
20 . This is because, as seen in the previous subsection, it is obtained by maximizing the
expected value of benefits.
21 . The model is different from most other models in which option values have been studied. It
is an infinite-horizon stochastic dynamic optimization model in which the maximand is the
expected present value of utility and future preferences evolve stochastically.
22 . Several other mathematicians and economists, such as Hernstein and Milnor (1953)
developed related axioms.
23 . The space of lotteries L is the space of all measurable and essentially bounded real
valued functions on the line.
24. A° denotes the complement of the set A.
25 . Chichilnisky (1996f) . See Machina (1982) for an alternative analysis to the von
Neumann-Morgenstern treatment of decisionmaking under uncertainty. Machina does
not provide an axiomatic treatment .
26 . Large probability events are events with probability close to one. Probabilities of events
are bounded above by the number one.
27 . The space of bounded sequences 1 is a Banach space with the norm 11 z ~) = super I z., ~ .
28 . The impact of traders' expectations on risks was studied by Green, Grandmont, Kurz,
and others.
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